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Abstract This paper presents computational implementations of models of the way that designers move 
between situations during design activity. The paper proposes a knowledge representation appropriate for 
situated models of design and describes the types of expectation present in such a model. Interpretation is 
described as a construction from expectations, and the movement from one situation to another as being 
influenced by these expectations. Implementations of this framework are described and three hypotheses about 
the way that designers move between situations are discussed. The implementations demonstrate the way that 
interpretation can lead to changes in the situation and the way that these changes are guided by past experiences. 
The paper discusses the significance of modelling the way that designers navigate their own knowledge and the 
role of changing expectations. 
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Designers frequently change their notion of what they are doing during design, but how this 
happens has not yet been adequately explained, nor has it been modelled computationally. 
Design can be conceived as a sequence of actions, distinguishable activities over time that 
take place within a situation (J.S. Gero, 1998). A feature of designerly activity is that 
designers change their notion of what they are doing as the activity progresses (Cross, 1982; 
J.S. Gero, 1990). This paper presents a model, based upon the findings of protocol studies of 
the way that designers change their goals and design requirements during design activity 
(Schon & Wiggins, 1992; Suwa, Gero, & Purcell, 2000), that can support computation of this 
type of designerly activity. Design is taken to be a situated activity and knowledge as 
grounded experience. From this perspective a description of movement between situations is 
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articulated and a computational model developed, implemented and used to examine 
hypotheses about designers moving between situations. 
 
The term situation (Clancey, 1997) refers here to a designer’s internal notion of the world at a 
particular time. This definition of situation in design is related to terms that emphasise 
aspects of the same notion: the current internal context (Kennedy & Shapiro, 2004), the 
current epistemic frame (Shaffer et al., 2009) and the current ecology of mind (Gabora, 
Rosch, & Aerts, 2008)1. A designer holds grounded knowledge from experience within the 
world (L W Barsalou, 2007). The situation refers to the parts of this knowledge that are being 
used to understand the world at this current moment and in this current experience; useful 
terms to describe these parts of knowledge are concepts and percepts. At a particular moment 
in time the designer holds a view of the world that comes from experience – from those parts 
of experience relevant to this moment. The interpretation that a designer makes is shaped by 
the current situation, i.e., this particular formulation of knowledge from experience. The work 
in this paper describes this interaction between experience and interpretation and shows how 
it leads to hypotheses about the way that designers move between different situations during 
design. 
 
The motivations for conceptualizing design as a sequence of situated acts are both to explain 
aspects of design that have not been adequately explained and to suggest ways that 
computation can become more designerly. There is empirical evidence that designers’ notions 
of what they are doing change during design activity (Fish & Scrivener, 1990; Gross & Do, 
2000; Suwa & Tversky, 1997). There is not yet an adequate understanding of the cognitive 
processes that relate knowledge from experience to the changing conception of the design 
task, nor of how to satisfactorily model them. An example of this is the way that designers 
make unexpected discoveries within their own work that inform their future design actions 
(Suwa, et al., 2000). These designerly phenomena are addressed in this paper through a 
situated framework (Clancey, 1997; J.S. Gero & Fujii, 2000). The paper develops a 
relationship between first person knowledge and interpretation within a situation. It addresses 
the questions of: (i) what does it mean for a designer to be in a situation; and (ii) how do 
designers move from one situation to another. 
                                                 
1 Gero and Smith (2009) focus upon these distinctions of definition. 
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These questions are defined then explored through the notion of situated interpretation. The 
paper describes an approach to knowledge representation suitable for modelling situated 
design. This knowledge representation is used first to describe the role of expectations in a 
situation and then to present a model of interpretation in design showing the interaction 
between expectations and the external world at different levels of abstraction. This model 
leads to specific hypotheses about design activity. The work uses computational models of 
interpretation to examine the hypotheses and to discuss their implications for design. 
1 Background 
1.1 Interpretation and unexpected discovery in design 
Whenever a designer brings something from the external world into their internal world, 
interpretation is occurring. For example, when a designer reads a design brief, considers their 
own work whilst sketching, or observes behaviours of a model, interpretation occurs – 
something external is given meaning internally by the designer. The literature reflects this 
movement from interpretation of a source AS a concept (Z. W. Pylyshyn, 1977) towards 
interpretation as situated conceptualisation (Lawrence W Barsalou, 2009). 
 
The interpretation that a designer produces arises from the interaction between the source 
(what it is that the designer is interpreting), the designer’s previous experiences (the 
knowledge held by the designer) and the situation (the world-view made up from parts of this 
knowledge). This can result in a designer being able to interpret the same work in many 
different ways when in different situations; this is captured in Henry David Thoreau’s 
(1851/1993) statement that “it’s not what you look at that matters but what you see”. 
 
A designer draws upon knowledge from past experiences. This knowledge is made use of 
within the current way of viewing the world (the situation); and as design progresses, this 
situation changes (John S Gero & Kannengiesser, 2004). This way of viewing design is as a 
progression of changing situations within which actions occur. The motivation for adopting 
this perspective is to understand the cognitive processes of changing interpretations of the 
world that appear to occur during design. 
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1.1.1 Unexpected discovery 
A phenomenon in design that illustrates this change of situation is that of unexpected 
discovery, the invention of design issues and requirements during design activity (Suwa, et 
al., 2000). When designers look at their own work they are capable of inventing new design 
issues and requirements, as observed by Gombrich (1966) that “in searching for a new 
solution Leonardo [da Vinci] projected new meanings into the forms he saw in his old 
discarded sketches”. Studies related to this phenomenon (Bilda, Gero, & Purcell, 2006; 
Menezes & Lawson, 2006; Schon & Wiggins, 1992; Suwa, et al., 2000) have typified the 
kinds of discoveries that are made by designers and linked some of these to the situation of 
the designer. Suwa et al (2000) note that whilst some functions arise based upon the list of 
initial requirements, others seem to be invented during design activity, such as those that are 
directed by the use of explicit knowledge or past cases, or those that have been extended from 
a previous goal through concretizing or broadening. Designers produce new design issues and 
requirements that are specific to their own experiences, that point in time, the state of the 
design medium, the state of the collaborators and the state of the beliefs about the design task. 
The new design issues and requirements indicate a change of situation. In this work a model 
is articulated for the kinds of cognitive processes that might explain how a designer moves 
from one situation to another, such that to an outside observer the designer appears to have 
invented a goal or requirement for the design. 
1.2 First person knowledge 
The central notion of situated design is that knowledge can be grounded in experience leading 
to knowledge that can be described as first person knowledge. There is no universally agreed 
definition of knowledge. A commonly accepted useful definition of knowledge is that it is a 
well-grounded belief with evidentiary support that is independent of the proponent of the 
knowledge. This independence of knowledge from its proponent lays the foundation for 
objective knowledge in science. For example, Newton’s laws, once they have been 
propounded, do not depend on the existence of Newton. This kind of knowledge is called 
“third person” knowledge in that a person removed from the original proponent of the 
knowledge can understand and make use of it. This is in contradistinction to knowledge that 
individuals gain through their experience and that is not independent of them and their 
experiences and is called “first person” knowledge. Much of the lives of individuals are built 
around first person knowledge rather than third person knowledge. 
Page 5 of 39 
 
 
A movement towards knowledge that is situated is a movement towards first person 
knowledge. In the use of knowledge in design this is captured by Gero’s (2007) principles of 
a computational paradigm for situated design: 
1. Principle of Effect: What you do matters. Actions that the system takes can change 
the knowledge held by the system. 
2. Principle of Ordered Temporality: When you do what you do matters. The 
chronology of the system’s use affects what is used and what is learned. 
3. Lemma of Experience: What you did before affects what you do now. A 
consequence of principles 1 and 2. 
4. Principle of Locality: Where you are when you do what you do matters. The state of 
the world external to the system affects the use of knowledge. 
5. Principle of Interaction: Who and what you interact with matters. A system learns 
through interaction with users and other systems. 
6. Principle of Ontology: What you think the world is about affects what it is about for 
you. A system’s conception of the world changes the interpretation of the world 
 
This is a call for systems that hold first person knowledge, where the learning and re-use of 
knowledge is tied to the experiences of the design agent: 
 
“It is claimed that situated design computing contains the seeds for the development 
of computational constructs that can be used to produce systems that match our 
notions of designerly activity. The two ideas of situatedness and constructive memory 
provide the basis for the development and use of experience in alternate situations. 
This is not a form of case-based reasoning or of default reasoning. It is a novel 
approach based on foundational concepts from cognition.” Gero (2007). 
 
When an external observer sees a designer at work, there is a changing conception of the 
goals of the design activity – they are a part of the situation of the designer. As design 
activity progresses the situation is seen to change as the designer brings new design elements 
to the design. An example of this is observed in a cognitive study of designing using a think-
aloud protocol: 
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"Our architect once decided to bring a water stream from the open plaza in front of 
the museum building into the entrance hall, as a means to guide visitors into the 
building in a cheerful way. Then, after a while, he noticed that water in the building 
may cause problems because humidity affects the artworks. But, because he thought 
that the idea of bringing water inside is still promising to produce a lively atmosphere, 
he set up a goal to search for a method to let artworks and water co-exist." (Suwa et al 
2000) 
 
The designer has commenced this activity within one situation, wanting to bring water into an 
open plaza as a guide. In interpreting the consequences of this when expressed in the design 
medium, the situation changes, bringing in a new goal to find a way of having the water and 
the artworks co-exist. This is distinct to a designer identifying a subgoal  of an existing goal 
(Newell & Simon, 1961). In drawing from experience during interpretation (observing the 
possible problems of humidity) the designer has invented a new goal (of having artworks and 
water together without the problems of humidity) that is a part of a changed situation. The 
work described in this paper comes from a motivation to understand how these changes to 
situation come about and how it is possible to model them. 
1.3 Outline of the paper 
Design is taken to be a sequence of situated acts and the notion of unexpected discovery has 
been used to give an example of the link between experience and interpretation. The 
remainder of the paper is concerned with: (i) describing an approach to knowledge 
representation suitable for a situated design agent; (ii) describing the expectations held by 
such an agent; (iii) presenting a model for interpretation in such an agent; and (iv) 
hypothesising the emergent behaviours that can be expected to be observed in such an agent 
during design activity. After explaining the basis for the hypotheses the paper describes three 
implementations that demonstrate how the effects of these hypotheses can emerge from 
experience, expectation and interpretation. 
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2 How designers move between situations during design 
activity 
2.1 Representing knowledge for design 
The following question was posed by Schön and Wiggins (1992): How do designers change 
the way that they see their own work during the design process? This research begins by 
positing the cognitive processes involved in interpretation and by exploring the connection 
between the first-person knowledge held by a designer and the types of seeing observed 
during design activity. It asks how designers make use of knowledge from experience when 
looking at their own work. 
 
Any attempt to model interpretation computationally requires a computational model of 
knowledge. The focus of this work is upon representing knowledge for design that includes 
first-person knowledge that is held by a designer and utilised within a situation. In 
representing knowledge in a way that is suitable for modelling situated design the same 
experiences can be utilised differently in different situations (Peng & Gero, 2006). Two 
notions that are relevant for such a system are abstraction, the creation of summary 
representations (L W Barsalou, 2005) and expectation, the notion that what an agent expects 
within a situation changes what they see. A framework is outlined here for a concept 
formation system for design that is driven by expectation and develops knowledge at 
different layers of abstraction. The work has its basis in the notion of perceptual symbol 
systems (Barsalou 1999). 
 
In perceptual symbol systems cognitive representations are based upon perceptual states (L 
W Barsalou, 1999). This is in contrast to an amodal symbol system, in which cognitive 
representations use a language which does not have a perceptual basis, e.g. natural language 
or abstract symbols (Fodor, 1975; Minsky, 1974; Pylyshyn, 1984). Barsalou (1999), 
Gärdenfors (2000), and Hawkins (2005) all propose different frameworks for how a 
perceptual symbol system can be modelled, and these types of models have been successfully 
used to computationally model specific phenomena (Pezzulo et al., 2011). In these models, 
concepts arise as summary representations over perceptual information. What starts as 
information in each of the senses becomes abstracted to the level where it can be manipulated 
as symbols, a transition from sub-symbolic to symbolic (Harnad, 1999). The cognitive 
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capabilities of a system arise from a combination of its native functions as well as its 
experiences in a reconciliation of nativism and constructivism (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994). 
 
In this work the conceptual spaces paradigm (Gärdenfors, 2000) is used to construct a 
computational model because: (i) it has been demonstrated to be useful for computation 
(Beyer, Cimiano, & Griffiths, 2012; Gärdenfors, 2000); and (ii) with the addition of 
situations to the model it becomes a computational framework that is a fit with the principles 
for situated design computing. This framework is based on the one outlined by Gero and Fujii 
(2000). 
 
There are four levels of abstraction in representing the knowledge that makes up this 
framework. The reasons for identifying four levels are as follows. At the lowest level of 
abstraction, a way of describing the data from the sensors of an agent is required, referred to 
here as senscepts (Montare, 1994) for uniformity. At the highest level of abstraction, agents 
learn how to co-ordinate their knowledge from experience (Clancey, 1999) and these highest 
level constructs will be referred to as situations. Between these sensor notions and the highest 
level of abstraction, an agent holds knowledge at different levels of abstraction. Rather than 
trying to accurately model humans, this work is concerned with creating a representation that 
is sufficient for modelling aspects of design. The structure is simplified by following 
Gärdenfors (2000) and using the notions of percepts and concepts to represent these layers of 
abstraction between senscepts and situations rather than weighing into the question of exactly 
how this fluid hierarchy of knowledge is structured. These four levels of abstraction of 
knowledge make use of the conceptual spaces architecture following Gärdenfors and an 
extension to include situations. 
2.1.1 Conceptual spaces: senscepts, percepts and concepts 
An agent has sensors which produce data during interaction with the external world. For 
example, an eye can sense changes in light, an ear changes in air pressure. Each datum from a 
sensor interacting with the world is referred to as a senscept. A senscept implies a dimension. 
For example, a human eye might generate a senscept for each of hue, brightness and 
saturation at a point in time (Gärdenfors, 2000). A dimension is the one-dimensional space 
within which the senscepts are located. Each dimension is a continuous variable of a certain 
range. 
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Dimensions that are inseparable create a perceptual domain within which percepts are 
located. Inseparable means that the agent cannot get information for one of the dimensions 
without getting information for all of them. To continue the previous example: in the human 
eye, hue cannot be obtained without also obtaining brightness and saturation (Gärdenfors, 
2000). A perceptual domain (e.g. texture, colour) is a space with dimensions of those things 
that the agent can sense. In the example of colour being sensed by hue, brightness and 
chromaticity, this results in a three-dimensional domain. Senscepts from a stimulus are 
grouped together to create a percept represented by a value within this perceptual domain. A 
percept within a perceptual domain is a vector space arising from the perceptual dimensions 
that constitute it. Just one layer is described here as indicative of all layers. 
 
A concept is a convergence zone that brings together spaces within perceptual domains that 
experience has shown to be related. For example, the concept for banana might bring 
together areas in the colour domain that might be called yellow, green and brown with areas 
in a shape domain that are associated with the Lady Finger and Cavendish banana varieties. It 
implicitly adopts a prototype theory of concepts where the most typical perceptual regions 
(e.g. the colours and shapes above for a banana) are associated and less typical instances of a 
concept have some distance (measured in conceptual space) from a prototype (Murphy, 
2002). Figure 1 shows the way that dimensions create the space of a perceptual domain, and 
the way that a concept associates regions in domains with each other. A part of the meaning 
of a concept comes from its relationship with other concepts. Just one layer is described here, 
although humans hold concepts at many layers of abstraction (Rosch, 1978). 
 
The strength of this formulation is that there is now a geometric representation of senscepts, 
percepts and concepts. Within this space, similarity can be calculated as the distance between 
two points within conceptual space (Gärdenfors, 2000; Nosofsky, 1988). This is important for 
interpretation, where similarity to existing concepts plays a role in determining whether the 
expectations are able to account for what the agent is experiencing. 
2.1.2 Adding situations to the knowledge representation 
Situations can be thought of as a convergence zone for these concepts – the memory of the 
co-ordination of concepts (L W Barsalou, 1999; Clancey, 1997, 1999). Concepts that are 
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utilised at the same time within an agent are a part of the same situation. This framework is 
extended by introducing a situation as a collection of concepts. The utility of a situation is 
that it allows for the explicit representation of the world view that arises from the use of a 
particular network of concepts. 
 
Situation is different from the other layers because it alone does not receive expectations 
from a layer above it. For example, perception knows what to expect of sensation because 
conception passes expectations down to it. In contrast, situation relies upon grounded 
experience alone. 
 
 
Figure 1 Levels in a hierarchy of knowledge organisation for design 
2.2 Implicit and explicit expectations of a designer 
This language of knowledge representation is used to describe the expectations of a designer 
during design activity. A designer holds knowledge about the world from their experience. At 
a certain moment in time, some of this knowledge is explicitly being utilised: asking the 
question “What are you doing now?” (Clancey, 1999) or think-aloud studies (Wright & 
Monk, 1985) are one way to get a sense of the explicit expectations of a designer. 
 
One attempt at describing the explicit expectations of a designer engaged in design activity is 
in the notion of design prototypes (J.S. Gero, 1990), which suggest that a designer holds 
notions about function, structure, expected and actual behaviour of the design; relational 
knowledge; qualitative knowledge; computational knowledge; and context knowledge. 
Moving from the construct of a design prototype back to the notion of a perceptual symbol 
system, these notions of the design can be described as types of concepts, percepts and 
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senscepts within a situation that are being used as resources by the designer in the current 
activity. 
 
In addition to this explicit knowledge within the situation there is implicit knowledge from 
the situation within the internal context of other knowledge from experience. An agent 
creates connections between different layers within the knowledge representation through 
experience as part of what is termed ‘memory’. Only some of these connections are utilised 
as a part of the explicit expectations. Implicit expectations, what might be described as 
connections that are below a liminal threshold, are those connections which exist but of 
which the agent is not aware. In these models of movement between situations these implicit 
expectations play a role in how the designer moves from one situation to another, and may be 
a guide to starting to answer the elusive question of: Why this design move and not another? 
 
The suggestion is then that a designer holds what can be described as two different types of 
expectations, those of which they are aware, the explicit, and those of which they are not 
aware or that are only implied by the structure of knowledge, the implicit. There are three 
notions from the literature that relate to attempts to model the effects of expectations: explicit 
and implicit memory – which map directly to explicit and implicit expectations; priming – 
how implicit expectations affect human behaviour; and selective attention – how expectations 
change human experience of stimuli. We provide a very brief introduction to these three 
notions for those not familiar with them. 
2.2.1 Explicit and implicit memory 
Explicit memory is the form of memory used “when performance on a task requires conscious 
recollection of previous experiences”(Graf & Schacter, 1985). Implicit memory is “when 
performance on a task is facilitated in the absence of conscious recollection" (Graf & 
Schacter, 1985) or “a behavioural, emotional and perceptual form of memory devoid of the 
subjective internal experience of self or of past" (Cozolino & Siegel, 2009). An example of 
explicit memory is deliberately bringing to mind the appearance of your first pet. An example 
of implicit memory is thinking that a statement is true because you think you have overheard 
somebody making that statement in the past; where, crucially, you are unaware of the use of 
your memory of hearing that statement (Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992). 
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2.2.2 Priming 
Priming is an effect observed when exposure to a stimulus affects the response to a 
subsequent stimulus. Experiments have demonstrated both perceptual priming (of forms) and 
conceptual priming (of categories) (Schacter, 1987). For example, “words might be presented 
in a study phase and then again, after a delay in a test phase when a priming measure such as 
reading speed is obtained. Participants are instructed to read words as quickly as possible in 
such a test and they are not informed that memory is being assessed. It is observed that 
priming improves the speed of recognition" (Phaller & Squire, 2009).  
2.2.3 Selective attention 
Selective attention is where certain features of either external stimuli or internal 
representations are noticed at the expense of others. Selectivity of attention has three 
dimensions (Cozolino & Siegel, 2009): (i) filtering - focussing on specific attributes (e.g. 
large shapes rather than small shapes); (ii) categorising - recognising information based on 
stimulus class (such as attending to squares and not other shapes); and (iii) pigeonholing - 
only using perceptual information needed to place a stimulus into a category (e.g. only 
looking at number of sides of a shape to classify it).  
2.3 Interpretation within a situation 
From these notions of a knowledge representation in which expectations are both implicit and 
explicit, a notion of what interpretation looks like in a situated design agent can be 
developed. Interpretation is concerned with reconciling two opposing goals of an agent: (i) to 
maintain a stable notion of the world; and (ii) to change its picture of the world when the 
world changes. Useful words to describe these opposing goals are “assimilation” (changing 
data from the world to fit expectations) and “accommodation” (changing expectations to fit 
the external world) after Piaget (1954). In describing a cognitive architecture that fits with 
design these two goals are described by the direction in which data flows. The word pull 
describes the flow of expectations – an attempt to construct what is expected from what is 
available. The word push describes the flow of data from the external world into perception 
and up the hierarchy of abstraction, challenging expectations. 
 
Interpretation is defined here from a situated cognition perspective as a continuous, dynamic, 
constructive activity that attempts to construct an internal representation from a source, using 
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expectations where it is possible and constructing an explanation from existing knowledge 
where it is not. It is an activity that is distributed across layers, with each layer attempting to 
first pull from the data available using expectations, and subsequently push from the data 
where this is unsuccessful. 
 
In design, this push and pull can be observed in the conversation with a design medium such 
as a sketch (John S Gero & Kannengiesser, 2004). The external source is interpreted using 
expectations – for example, the ideas held by the designer when making the sketch. Changes 
in the situation can be described as occurring when something does not adequately fit the 
expectations used for interpretation. Cases can be described where something that the 
designer is interpreting does not fit the expectations at the different levels of sensation, 
perception, conception and situation and how something might be constructed that does fit.  
 
Interpretation begins with pull, an attempt to construct what is expected from what is 
available. The output of pull is interpreted data of the type described by the layer. The 
interpreted data from pull in sensation, perception, conception and situation respectively are 
senscepts, percepts, concepts and situations. Pull tries to construct expectations from the 
source for the layer. Push is the part of interpretation that begins with the source. There will 
be times when expectations are not able to be constructed, when there are incorrect 
expectations or when something new is encountered. Push is the part of interpretation that 
allows for the unexpected to be recognised and allows for new knowledge to be learned. 
 
An example can be used to show the difference between push and pull. A stimulus can 
demand attention, `pushing' its way into sensation, such as the way that regardless of your 
expectations when your mobile phone rings, you notice it. Pull shows the way that 
expectations can change an experience. Consider that you are attempting to meet up with a 
friend in a crowd. Based upon the back of somebody's head you think that you see your 
friend and rush to catch up with them. However, as you get closer you realise that they look 
only a little like your friend. This is an example of pull because the expectations of seeing the 
friend have changed the way that the world is seen: the interpretation has been constructed 
from expectations. 
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The term source is used because it recognises that from any source it is possible to pull many 
different kinds of interpreted data. It is possible to internally represent a single source in 
many different ways. For example, a stimulus will yield different senscepts depending upon 
which sensors are pointed at it and how those sensors are primed. An ear pointed at a 
lawnmower and an eye pointed at the lawnmower produce different senscepts, and an ear 
expecting the lawnmower produces different senscepts to one that is not. The same 
construction from the source is present in all of the layers. A layer in a system of 
interpretation is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Pull from expectations and push from data within a layer  
2.3.1 Examples from each layer during interpretation 
Sensation pulls data from the source based upon what it expects to sense, through control of 
its sensors. Expectations of sensation during interpretation are driven by the requirements of 
perception. For example, people turn so that their eyes are facing towards something that they 
want to see, or act to touch something that they want to feel. As well as controlling the 
orientation of their sensors people control the functioning of their sensors, such as the 
opening of an eyelid or the flaring of nostrils. 
 
Perception pulls from senscepts to construct percepts, based upon what it expects to see. 
Expectations of perception during interpretation are driven by the requirements of 
conception. Gestalt perception provides examples of perceptual constructions based upon 
expectation (Zusne, 1970). An agent constructs the illusory Kanisza triangle seen in Figure 3 
by the continuation of the lines suggested by the sectors cut out from the three black circles. 
In another example, people are played an audio track, consisting of a continuous musical note 
interrupted by white noise before the note resumes. People are able to hear the note 
continuing through the middle of the white noise (Riecke, van Opstal, Goebel R, & 
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Formisano, 2007). This is an example of perception in the auditory system pulling out of the 
noise what it expects to be finding.  
 
Conception pulls from percepts to construct concepts, based upon what it expects. 
Expectations of conception during interpretation are driven by the requirements of situation. 
There are two aspects to pull from conception: (i) an attempt to pull percepts that are 
expected to occur within the expected concepts; and (ii) changing the use of percepts to fit the 
concepts. Examples of pull from conception can be seen in conceptual priming experiments 
(Schacter, 1987), such as the one performed by Graf et al (1985) where subjects were primed 
with a list of words and performed a task of identifying eight exemplars for a category, where 
it was demonstrated that the primed words had influenced the spoken words.  
 
Situation pulls from the available concepts to construct the expected situation. Unlike the 
other layers, situation does not have a layer above it. When the expected situation cannot be 
constructed from the available concepts the situation changes either through: (i) a switch to 
another situation that experience suggests will be useful; or (ii) a change to the current 
situation. Through experience, agents come to expect concepts to be co-ordinated in a certain 
way. There are two aspects to pull from situation: (i) an attempt to pull concepts that are 
expected to occur together; and (ii) changing the use of concepts to fit the situation. An 
example of this can be seen in the `runway width illusion' encountered by pilots, Figure 4 
(Parmet & Gillingham, 2002). In this illusion, the pilot is accustomed to a certain runway 
width. When approaching a runway that is narrower than they are accustomed to, the pilot 
thinks that they are higher than they really are, scenario (b) in Figure 4. In terms of pull, the 
pilot is expecting the runway on approach to have certain visual characteristics. The 
perceptual expectations of the pilot are being met, but this is only because of the frame of 
expectations within which they are operating. If an instructor sitting next to the pilot were to 
tell them that the runway was narrower than they expected, then the concepts available to 
situation no longer fit with the concepts expected. As a result, the situation changes to 
another situation. Within this new situation, exactly the same perceptual data leads the pilot 
to a safe landing. 
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Figure 3 A Kanisza triangle 
 
Figure 4 The effect of runway width on the pilot’s image of the runway (left) and the potential effect on the 
approach path flown (right) where dashed line indicates pilot perception: (a) normal approach; (b) narrow 
runway makes the pilot feel higher than they actually are; and (c) wide runway makes the pilot feel lower than 
they actually are (after Parmet and Gillingham 2002) 
2.3.2 Interpretation as dynamic and constructive 
Interpretation in this way forms a part of a complex system in which small departures from 
expectations can lead to large changes in the world view of the agent. Figure 5 shows a 
dynamic system constructed from multiple self-similar layers of the type seen in Figure 2. 
Each layer attempts to construct what it expects to find from what is available in the layer 
below. The output from each layer is to make data available to the layer above, and to feed 
back to the layer below to alter its expectations. It is difficult to predict the changes that will 
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occur in the system when one layer is changed, where a small change in the topmost layer can 
lead to large changes in the layers below, or that a small change in a lower layer can result in 
all layers changing. This is inspired by the models of Hawkins, Barsalou and Gärdenfors, 
who are in turn inspired by the neuroscience literature (L W Barsalou, 1999; Gärdenfors, 
2000; Hawkins, 2005; Mountcastle, 1997). 
 
This phenomenon has been observed in designers changing their design trajectory through 
observations within their own sketches (Suwa, et al., 2000; Suwa & Tversky, 1997) where 
small changes in a representation can result in a re-conceptualization of the design problem. 
 
During interpretation, if a layer cannot construct what it is expecting to find from what is 
available, it changes its expectations. This idea of designers moving from one concept to 
another or from one situation to another situation is the focus of this work, i.e., What guides 
this movement from one expectation to another expectation? 
 
The response introduced and explored in this work is to propose that connections within and 
between layers at different levels of abstraction are developed through experience; and that 
the movement to a different expectation is guided by these connections and the data 
available. Through interaction with the world over the course of its life, the agent has 
developed connections within a layer (e.g. between concepts and concepts) and between 
layers (e.g. between concepts and percepts). The hypothesis is that the design conversation 
with a medium is a way of navigating this type of knowledge. 
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Figure 5 The dynamic system resulting from multiple layers with the presence of feedback from the interpreted 
data of one layer to the expectations of the layer below 
2.4 Movement between situations. 
An approach to knowledge representation has been described that is both a good fit for 
situated design and applicable for computation, using the language of senscepts, percepts, 
concepts and situations. Within this model designers can be described as holding both explicit 
and implicit expectations. Interpretation is described as an activity that attempts to construct 
from expectations at different layers of abstraction. Expectations are changed using grounded 
knowledge from experience when existing expectations are no longer useful. 
 
Interpretation of a source occurs within a situation and produces an internal representation. 
From this description of interpretation as a dynamic, constructive activity of push and pull 
from what is available, the following three hypotheses about designers interpreting can be 
proposed that arise: 
1. Attempts to construct an interpretation using expectations can lead to a 
change in the situation. When pull is unable to produce what is expected, 
expectations can be changed by push during interpretation; this is the initial 
phenomenon described by Suwa et al (Suwa, et al., 2000; 1997). The hypothesis is 
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that this movement to a changed situation can occur as a part of the activity of 
interpretation, as described in this paper. 
2. Small changes in a source can lead to large changes in the internal 
representation. If the proposed dynamic model of interpretation at different levels of 
abstraction fits then we expect to observe this type of phenomena in designers where 
small changes to a source, through the complex system that draws upon the 
experiences of a designer, can manifest as large changes to the internal representation. 
3. Changes to the situation have their origin in the experiences of the design 
agent, manifested as connections between knowledge at different levels within a 
hierarchy of abstraction. In answering the question "where do design expectations 
come from?" there is the possibility of making a connection between experience (how 
it is held by a designer) and the cognitive processes by which experience brings 
expectations into a design activity. 
3 Modelling movement between situations during design 
activity 
Three computational models were produced based upon a conceptual spaces knowledge 
representation, in which aspects of the system are situated and interpretation occurs as a 
dynamic construction through push and pull. 
3.1 The approach 
Self-Organising Maps (SOMs) (Kohonen, 1990) facilitate unsupervised learning as well as 
having a straightforward learning algorithm, making them suitable for adaptation to a 
hierarchy of SOMs (Dittenbach, Merkl, & Rauber, 2000) as called for by the model of 
knowledge representation for a situated agent, as well as suitable for experimenting with 
feedback and feedforward within the hierarchy.  
 
The models described in this section use two layers of linked SOMs in the testing of the 
hypotheses. Figure 6 shows two connected SOMs, where the activation of nodes in the lower 
layer forms the input into the higher layer, marking an abstraction from the data. The lower 
layer creates an abstraction from input data whilst the higher layer creates an abstraction over 
the activity of the lower layer. 
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Figure 6 Linked SOMs representing abstraction from data. 
 
Interpretation within the linked network uses both pull (from expectations, with feedback 
through the network) and push (from data, with feedforward through the network). 
 
An overview of push and pull within a two layer neural network as a sequence of steps is 
presented in Figure 7. Step 1 in Figure 7 is an attempt to pull from expectations in layer 1. If 
pull cannot occur, then step 2 is push from the source. Either from push or pull, the 
interpreted data from layer 1 is the data available to the layer above, layer 2. Step 3 is an 
analog for step 1, where layer 2 attempts to pull from expectations using the data available 
from layer 1. If the expectations of layer 2 cannot be used for pull, then push into layer 2 
occurs, step 4. This is different to push in layer 1 because it is the topmost layer and there are 
no higher layers in which to test expectations. Push in layer 2, step 4, results in either: (i) a 
change to different expectations that are more suited; or (ii) the construction of a new 
expectation based upon the data. 
 
If the expectations change in layer 2 then the expectations of layer 1 are updated as feedback, 
step 5. Step 1 is now repeated, but with new expectations, step 6. This cycle can be iterated 
and extended to multiple linked networks. 
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Figure 7 Push-pull in a two layer system with numbered steps of: (1) pull from expectations in layer 1; (2) push 
from the source into layer 1; (3) pull from the expectations of layer 2; (4) push from layer 1 into layer 2; (5) an 
update of layer 1 expectations by layer 2; (6) interpretation through pull from layer 1 with the updated 
expectations. 
3.1.1 Describing the implementation 
Two SOMs are implemented to represent a lower layer of abstraction 𝑆𝑂𝑀1 and a higher 
layer of abstraction 𝑆𝑂𝑀2. Each is a 2D SOM described by the number of nodes in each 
dimension, 𝑢 and 𝑣, and a number of features, 𝑓, Equations 1 and 2. 
𝑆𝑂𝑀1(𝑢, 𝑣,𝑓)   (1) 
𝑆𝑂𝑀2(𝑢, 𝑣,𝑓)    (2) 
During training, each SOM uses the Kohonen training algorithm (Kohonen, 1990) in a two 
phase training of: (i) reducing the neighbourhood radius to 1; and (ii) reducing the learning 
increment from 0.1 to 0. If an input vector of 𝑥 is introduced to the network then the best 
matching node 𝐵𝑀𝑈 = 𝑚𝑢,𝑣 is the one that has the least Euclidian distance 𝑑𝐸(𝑥,𝑚𝑢,𝑣). 
 
In training, the outputs from 𝑆𝑂𝑀1 form the inputs into 𝑆𝑂𝑀2 with co-ordination of multiple 
outputs forming a single input in some of the models described. The situated effects 
described here only take effect following training. 
 
In a typical SOM the set of all nodes 𝑀 = �𝑚0,0,𝑚0,1,𝑚02, … ,𝑚1,0, … ,𝑚𝑢,𝑣� is used to 
establish 𝐵𝑀𝑈. In the models described here expectations are implemented as a subset of all 
nodes. {𝑀∗|𝑀∗ ⊂ 𝑀}   (3) 
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The similarity in the models is defined by the Nosofsky distance (Nosofsky, 1988) between 
the input and best matching unit 𝑑𝑁�𝑥,𝑚𝑢,𝑣� = 𝑒−𝑐∗(𝑑𝐸 )2. A similarity threshold 𝜎 is defined 
as a minimum similarity required for pull to occur in the system. Pull can only occur within a 
SOM if the inequality described in Equation 4 holds. {𝐵𝑀𝑈 ∈ 𝑀∗|𝑑𝑁(𝐵𝑀𝑈, 𝑥) < 𝜎}   (4) 
 
When the set described by Equation 4 is empty in 𝑆𝑂𝑀1, a cue is given to 𝑆𝑂𝑀2 that a 
change of expectations is required. This comes from the layer above. If this is the top layer 
then the 𝐵𝑀𝑈 here is used. The change to 𝑀 ∗ is in this way a function of the output from the 
layer above. 
3.2 Situations and expectations 
In section 2.2 two types of expectation were described as explicit and implicit; those that are 
a part of the situation and those that are implied by the knowledge structure surrounding the 
situation. A further categorisation of expectations into those that are spatial and those that are 
temporal is useful for describing the modelling of expectations. Spatial expectations relate to 
the idea that observed co-occurring instances will occur together again. Temporal 
expectations relate to the idea that an observed sequential progression will occur again. This 
section describes a demonstration using shapes, and then presents two variations that were 
carried out with an environment changing over time and then a similar experiment with a 
different environment of letters.  
3.2.1 Changing situations in a constructive interpretation agent 
Two linked self-organising maps as seen in Figure 7 were trained on a set of representations 
generated pseudo-randomly by an algorithm. Each representation was made up of three 
shapes in a linear sequence, with each shape overlaid upon a tartan grid. The network was 
initially trained on 500,000 such representations. The rules for generating each representation 
in the training phase were:  
(i) Each of the three tartan grids is 16 x 16 squares in size 
(ii) The first square is filled with a randomly determined shape. This means 
randomly selecting one of three algorithms for filling in black squares in the 
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tartan grid to create one of three possible shapes: a square, a cross or a 
triangle. Each algorithm allowed for a random width and height  
(iii) The other two squares are subsequently filled out to produce one of two 
patterns: (a) with all three squares the same shape, although potentially 
different sizes through random generation; or (b) with all three shapes 
different, again with potentially different sizes. 
 
The representation at t=1 in Figure 8 gives an example of a representation of three squares 
produced in this way. The rules described above in training are manifested in the network as 
what can be described as expectations that could be inferred by a human observer as a 
heuristic, e.g. if it sees two shapes the same it will have expectations that the third shape will 
be similar.  
 
Figure 8 Four representations (left block) and internal representation after interpreting (right block) as a time 
sequence (the light grey is an artefact of the abstraction that occurs during training of the SOM). 
 
The first model demonstrates the capacity for a computational model to learn concepts from 
experience in a way that is situated, and to then demonstrate how this conceptual co-
ordination changes the way the world looks when constructively interpreting. The notion of a 
threshold of similarity is used to designate the degree of similarity that is required to be able 
to construct from an expectation using the data available. This degree of similarity required is 
dynamic and changing with the situation.  
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In the test phase of the model following training, three random shapes were produced to 
create a representation that may or may not obey the rules presented during training, e.g. it 
could be two squares and a triangle.  The way that constructive interpretation occurs in the 
model can be described by: 
(i) Temporal explicit expectations: The trained network holds expectations that the 
shapes seen at time t will still be present at time t+1. For example, if it has seen 
three squares at time t it will attempt to construct three squares at time t+1. If the 
similarity threshold is not satisfied at each level of the network (firstly in 
constructing each of the three shapes found as squares in layer 1, then in putting 
the three shapes presented to layer 2 together) then the expectation needs to be 
changed 
(ii) Spatial implicit expectations: When interpretation in a layer is unable to 
construct what it is expecting to find, the network changes its expectations. The 
knowledge structure present in the agent from training guides this change of 
expectations. In this case, this is a spatial expectation that if, for example, one 
square is found then it will expect to find two more squares or two different 
shapes. This is a movement that is guided by the proximity of nodes within the 
network of SOMs. 
(iii) Learning: In interpretation there will be occasions where neither explicit 
expectations in the situation, nor implicit expectations from a guided search of 
knowledge, can adequately construct an explanation for the data that a layer is 
finding. In this case, learning would occur. However, this model did not 
implement a learning algorithm in the testing phase, rather it progressively 
reduces the similarity threshold until an interpretation results. 
 
An example of the results produced by the constructive interpretation model is shown in 
Figure 8. Two notable effects of constructive interpretation occur at times t=2 and t=3 where 
the model produces an internal representation different to what a human observer might see. 
At time t=2 the model has an expectation of seeing three squares. This expectation is strong 
enough, or the data is similar enough, that the lower layer can construct what it is expecting 
from what it sees and it follows that the higher layer can do the same. In this case the 
temporal expectation has been used to construct the internal representation. The case at time 
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t=3 is different, as the temporal expectations have not been useful – there is not sufficient 
similarity to construct from these expectations. In this case, the network uses implicit 
expectations to find something that does fit. The way that this occurs in the model is that the 
two cross shapes are constructed in the lower layer (push), a situation is moved to in the 
higher layer that fits the new information (push), the expectations of the lower layer are 
changed (feedback) and the lower layer is able to construct from what is expected, resulting 
in the stable internal representation. 
 
This demonstration provides confirmatory evidence for the first and third hypotheses through 
the connection between past experiences and movement to new situations. In the model, 
when the expectations held by the model do not serve, new expectations are used. Two 
questions that arise are: where do new expectations come from and how are new expectations 
tested? In this model all expectations were drawn from past experiences in the training phase. 
In answer to the second question, a technique was used of search through spreading 
activation within a layer. 
3.2.2 Variation on the model 
Two variations of the model were created to demonstrate different effects of constructive 
interpretation. In the first, a model was trained on similar shapes2 in the same way as 
previously, Figure 9. The aim of the test phase was to observe a change of situation occurring 
in a gradually changing environment. In this test phase the network was presented with a 
representation resulting from the rules (e.g. three crosses) and moved from this through to 
another representation resulting from the rules (e.g. three squares) by a type of ‘keyframing’ 
over time, by first adding and then removing filled squares within the tartan grid, Figure 9.  
 
                                                 
2 The only difference here is in the inclusion of a different kind of ‘diagonal’ cross  
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Figure 9 Four representations of a gradually changing environment (left block) and internal representation after 
interpreting (right block) as a time sequence 
 
In Figure 9, at time t=0 the model has a situation in which three crosses have been 
interpreted, and this continues to time t=1 regardless that environment has changed further 
away from this interpretation. However, at time t=2 the model can no longer construct the 
expected interpretation of three crosses; the situation changes based upon the data available 
to interpreting a cross, a triangle and a square. 
 
Whilst this is a simple example, it represents the kind of phenomena seen during design 
activity where a designer can carry out activity within a situation for some time before, to an 
outside observer, there appears to be a large shift in the way that the design task is conceived 
– a change in the situation. At time t=3 the environment changes further, and whilst it now 
appears to an outside observer as three squares, the network continues to interpret this as a 
cross, a triangle and a square, because in the world of the model what it is seeing is a fit with 
expectations. 
 
This example shows a movement in which the situation is stable whilst the data changes, but 
once a threshold is reached in which the situation can no longer explain the data, it changes to 
account for this data. The phenomenon is evocative of the Sorites paradox, which observes 
that one grain of sand is not a heap and that by adding one grain of sand it does not become a 
heap and so induces that adding any number of grains will not make a heap. The analogy is 
useful, as the resolution of the paradox is related to our human conception of what it means 
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for a number of grains of sand to be a ‘heap’. Similarly, in the demonstration, the small 
changes that are occurring in the environment become enough (in this case at time t=2) for 
the system to change the situation. The small changes to the environment can result in a 
stable interpretation that suddenly changes in a way that to an external observer is not 
commensurate to the small change in the environment.  
 
Another variation serves to show that the same technique can be extended beyond working 
with shapes to show how the same phenomenon with letters creates a phenomenon that 
appears quite human, of seeing words to which we are habituated rather than a random 
assortment of letters. A similar training phase occurred in the setup for this demonstration, 
using letters instead of shapes3, and the rules for constructing representations were to use 
only combinations of letters found in the English language4. In the example shown in Figure 
10 the model sees the letters H,H,T as the word H,A,T. The way in which this constructed 
interpretation differs from traditional applications of AI algorithms (e.g. a typical SOM 
network) is that the interpretation is distributed over different layers, each attempting to 
construct from what is available and involves conceptual co-ordination over both space and 
time. Instead of a ‘one-shot’ approach in which either an interpretation is found or not, there 
is a dynamic convergence. In this case, the lower layer is not able to construct what it is 
expecting to find in the case of the letter A. However, the upper layer is able to construct 
what is it is expecting to find, a word that corresponds to experience. The feedback from this 
upper layer’s satisfaction of expectation feeds into the lower layer and the interpretation is 
settled upon – in this case from the top down.  
 
Figure 10 Conceptual co-ordination in space and time 
                                                 
3 Algorithms were written for each of the letters A, E, H and T such that a letter of a random size was produced 
4 The words HAT, CAT, EAT, ATE 
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These demonstrations show some features of the model of constructive interpretation. The 
feedforward and feedback within each layer of the model serve to distribute this search for 
more suitable expectations. A suitable expectation does not mean ‘a good fit for data’ but 
rather ‘a good fit for the situation’. The third demonstration with letters shows this, that the 
letter H had a good fit from perceptual experiences, but within the situation this was 
constructed as an A due to a higher layer finding an expectation that fit. This happened 
because the network was interpreting within a situation. In other words, the movement to a 
new set of expectations is always relative to where the model (or designer) currently is. In the 
models the guide for a change of expectations is from past experiences expressed through a 
search within each layer through spreading activation guided by similarity. 
3.4 How does the situation change? 
Designer are observed to move between different interpretations of a design medium. A 
question asked by observers of a designer is often ‘why this novel interpretation and not some 
other?’ The idea proposed here is that an interpretation is constructed from expectations and 
that there are expectations implicit in a situation that guide movements to new interpretations. 
This model shows how through constructive interpretation a system with experience can 
exhibit behaviour that looks to an external observer like unexpected discovery. This model 
provides evidentiary support for all three hypotheses. 
 
A network similar to that described in the previous section was first trained on a set of 54 
floor plans, Figure 11. These floor plans are a selection from the work of three prominent 
architects: Frank Lloyd Wright, Louis Khan and Andrea Palladio. They were used as there is 
existing work showing that there is a correlation between the perception of similarity in these 
sketches in humans and in neural networks (Jupp, 2005; Jupp & Gero, 2010). The model 
perceived each image by first using edge detection and a sharpening algorithm on the images 
and then feeding the resulting black and white pixels into the lower layer of the network as a 
sequence of 16x16 features. In the model a single floor plan becomes represented as a 
number of perceptual maps co-ordinated within a situation, Figure 12. 
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Figure 11 A sample of 16 floor plans from the full set of 54 plans by  
Palladio, Lloyd Wright and Khan (source: (Jupp, 2005)) 
 
As a result of this training the set of these 54 floor plans come to be represented within the 
same two maps each at a different level of abstraction. At the lower level of the two 
networks, similarities can be measured across different experiences. For example, one of the 
perceptual maps from a Khan floor plan might be more perceptually similar (in terms of 
distance within the perceptual map) to a perceptual map from a Palladio floor plan than it is 
to another Khan floor plan. 
Page 30 of 39 
 
 
Figure 12 Representations of experience of floor plans within the network 
 
This is one of a series of models that can be termed generate-and-interpret in which the 
actual generation is not so important as the effect that it has upon the situation. Rather than 
generate-and-test models which have a fitness function to use for testing, the aim of a 
generate-and-interpret model is to explore the different types of interpretation that can be 
computationally modelled – they aim to implement and test the way that a computational 
model explores its own knowledge. 
 
The model begins activity with a set of expectations, taking one of the floor plans from 
experience and utilising the perceptual features associated with it for generating designs by 
randomly placing the perceptual features in the design medium – this is the starting point for 
the model. The system generates each step in the process by first interpreting the design 
medium, and then erasing it. It continues by randomly placing elements once again (the 
explicit expectations at the perceptual level) into the design medium. It uses the lower level 
maps that the system holds from its training in the different floor plans of well-known 
architects. 
 
A snapshot of the model in progress is in Figure 13. The four images on the left-hand side 
show the four explicit perceptual expectations that the model is using in generating a design. 
The image at the top-centre shows the current state of the design external to the system in the 
design medium. Below this is in the centre is a representation of the floor plan from 
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experience that is implicitly associated with these expectations. The right-hand side shows 
the perceptual features that have been used as a result of interpretation.  
 
 
Figure 13 Interpreting using explicit concepts after random generation 
 
Interpretation is done through a ‘sliding window’ that saccades across the image attempting 
to construct an interpretation from expectations and stopping when four interpreted percepts 
have been found. The heuristics for this movement are: 
1. Attempt to construct from explicit perceptual expectations within the current window 
2. Attempt to construct from implicit perceptual expectations within the current window 
3. Move the window to the right; if the edge is found move the window down and start 
again from the left 
 
Putting this together, the model follows iterations of: 
1. commence with a set of explicit expectations 
2. randomly generate a design using these expectations  
3. interpret this design using its current expectations but potentially using implicit 
expectations 
4. repeat from step 1. 
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In the example seen in Figure 13, the explicit expectations of percepts have all been found in 
interpreting – in other words, the situation after interpreting is no different to the situation 
before interpreting. 
 
What happens when the model finds concepts that are implicitly expected is shown in Figure 
14. Implicit expectations within the model are those that are similar (as defined by distance 
within conceptual space) to explicit expectations. What this means in practice is that as the 
model is generating and interpreting it creates novel interpretations for existing design 
elements. This changes the situation, as these implicit expectations are brought into the 
design situation. In the model, this was made into an iterative process by then drawing with 
these concepts that are the new explicit expectations. The result is that the model is exploring 
its own knowledge from experience in a series of steps. The guides for exploring its own 
knowledge are: (i) the conceptual similarity between explicit expectations and other 
expectations that exist from experience; and (ii) the relationships in the design medium that 
emerge. 
 
Figure 14 The system constructs an interpretation using two of implicit expectations and two explicit 
expectations 
 
The effect of this is that the model works within its current understanding of the design 
problem until something triggers a change of situation, Figure 15.  
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Figure 15 Grey ellipsoid is a situation that contains the set of implicit and explicit expectations. Black circle is 
the internal conception of the current design within this situation. Time progression is represented through black 
arrows of changing conceptions of design and changing situations. 
 
In the model, making an interpretation can lead to the situation changing, with different 
expectations present. The contribution of the model is to show how the relationship between 
past experiences and these changes of situation. There is the potential for movement to new 
expectations within each layer of abstraction. This can lead to, for example, low level 
perceptual similarity serving as a cue for new higher level expectations. The model 
demonstrates how the hypotheses that emerge from this model of interpretation relate to 
phenomena observed in designers. 
3.5 Discussion from the models 
Two questions that arise are: where do new expectations come from and how are new 
expectations tested? 
 
The work can be seen as an example of models that generate-and-interpret, as distinct from 
those that generate-and-test. This type of model makes a contribution in the way that it 
navigates its own knowledge through interpretation. In the models described here the design 
actions were random and unconsidered, but the models are interesting because of the 
implementation of interpretation that resulted in the model exploring its own knowledge. In 
the model described in Section 3.4 it was shown that it could commence working with 
notions drawn from sketches by Louis Khan, and could “see” things within the (randomly 
produced) designs that caused it to bring notions from Frank Lloyd Wright sketches into the 
design situation.  
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There are many ways that interpretation could be implemented as inspired by recent ideas 
from cognition. Generate-and-interpret models facilitate testing these different 
implementations. 
 
The key observations from the demonstrations produced from this model of situated design 
are: 
1. Expectations exist at different levels of abstraction 
2. Interpretation involves three activities: (i) constructing from existing expectations 
using data available; (ii) changing expectations when existing expectations do not 
work; and (iii) distributing this across multiple layers of abstraction through 
feedforward of data and feedback of expectations 
3. Change of expectations is relative to the current expectations; an analogy is that past 
experiences are a map, current expectations are a location and change of expectations 
is movement within this landscape. Whilst this sounds like spreading activation, it 
functions differently due to the distribution of expectations across different layers of 
abstraction and the links between them. 
4. Stability exists in a slowly changing environment, followed by a sudden jump to a 
different situation. This maps well onto the kind of behaviour that is observed in 
designers making unexpected discoveries 
3.5.1 Potential of the models 
The implementation described here makes use of two linked SOM maps, but the ideas could 
be implemented in many other ways. Similar results would be expected with ART networks 
(Carpenter & Grossberg, 1988) and potentially hierarchical ART networks that could be 
adapted to fit (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1990; Tscherepanow, 2010). Adapting existing 
hierarchical unsupervised learning systems such as deep belief networks (Hinton, Osindero, 
& Teh, 2006; Lee, Grosse, Ranganath, & Ng, 2009) to hold expectations in a way that fits the 
notions of situatedness described here, is a potential avenue of further research. 
 
Whilst the models described use single-thread programming, future models can explore what 
happens when this process occurs in parallel within each layer to set up a dynamic system. 
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The implementations appear to fulfil some of the expectations of cognitive studies of design 
described in Section 2. An empirical study of a model could be facilitated using these 
techniques comparing the two explicitly and finding generate-and-test implementations for 
interpretation that better suit what we observe in human designers. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper has articulated a type of knowledge representation appropriate for situated design. 
It has demonstrated one way of computationally implementing this knowledge representation 
and has provided support for hypotheses about design that result from this. 
 
The work has examined how situations change during design activity. In this paper the 
expectations held by a designer have been linked to the process of interpretation, and a 
change of situation linked to a change of expectations. These models demonstrate the way 
that interpretation uses expectations resulting in the type of phenomena observed in designers 
bringing knowledge into the design situation and changing their ideas about the activity in 
which they are engaged.  
 
It has been proposed that changes to the situation happen at multiple of abstraction within 
such a model of a designer; and that when expectations are not met, the implicit conceptual 
similarity guides the movement to new expectations. This can be observed in the results from 
the computational implementation, which provide support for three hypotheses about design: 
1. It was hypothesised that attempts to construct an interpretation using expectations can 
lead to a change in the situation. This was observed within the models where the 
process of attempting to construct an interpretation from expectations, when these 
were not met, led to a change of expectations. This resulting change of situation, to an 
external observer, looks like the phenomenon of changing situations in a designer 
2. Small changes in a source can lead to large changes in the internal representation. It 
was observed that small changes in the stimulus outside the model can result in a 
large change in the situation. This was observed most clearly in the model of a 
gradually changing environment that maintains the situation until it is no longer 
useful, at which point the situation can change quite dramatically.  
3. Changes to the situation have their origin in the experiences of the design agent, 
manifested as connections between knowledge. When the situation changes, it 
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changes in ways that are related to the first person knowledge of the design agent 
from past experiences. In the model one heuristic for a way that this could occur has 
been expressed, as spreading activation at different layers of abstraction. 
 
The primary contribution of this work is in utilising concepts from situated cognition to 
model the way that designers explore their own knowledge through interpretation in a way 
that matches observed behaviour 
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